



JFACC JOINT AIR OPERATIONS PLAN OPERATION ACTIVE RESOLVE

Updated and effective as of: D4 (Real world date: 14 Oct 2022)

1 Situation

Following a surprise attack by Syria on July 1st of 2011, a coalition of the willing formed Combined Joint Task Force 82 (CJTF82) in order to support Turkey and to enforce UN resolution UNSCR 3263 empowering states to use <u>all means necessary</u> to force Syria out of Turkey after the deadline set to 31st of August 2011 stipulated in UNSCR 3274.

1.1 Adversary Forces

A full breakdown of the current intelligence picture is available in the VIS INTSUM D0, available at OPAR BRIEF.

1.1.1 Syrian Army

Syrian 1st Corps have seized the Birecik Dam and Gaziantep International Airport and are currently in defensive positions. With what is believed to be the 11th Mech. Division HQ have been reported at Gaziantep Airfield, and what is believed to be the 12th Motor Division HQ reported to the north-east of Birecik Dam. There are also reports of what is believed to be the 1st Corp HQ at Minakh Airbase. 1st Corp's 10th Armor Division is currently also believed to be at Minakh Airbase.

During the first three days of the campaign, Syrian forces believed to be from the Syrian 1st Corps have struck North-East from Gazientep, seizing control of another dam to the northwest of Sanliurfa. Currently, their intentions are not known.



Further, the Syrian 1st Corps have begun to employ long-ranged artillery and missile attacks upon a friendly FARP situated to the north of Gazientep

Syrian 2nd Corp have occupied the border region close to the Hatay Province and is likely preparing an assault to seize Hatay Airport in order to prevent CJTF82 forces using the base as a staging area for operations and logistics. It is also believed that the 2nd Corp will seek to deploy long-range missile artillery in the highlands of the southern region of Hatay in order to deny operations from Hatay as well as Incirlik AB.

Syrian 3rd Corps are established in defensive positions south and west of Damascus

Syrian 4th Corps are conducting rear duty assignments and protecting Damascus

Syrian 5th Corps are reported to be in their base at Palmyra, finishing their workup and preparation for operations. It is believed that the 5th Corp might start moving NORTH to take part in the offensive and further expand Syrian territory in Turkey.

1.1.2 Syrian Air Force

Syrian aircrafts have been conducting CAP missions in support of their own operations inside Turkey, as well as supporting the Army's offensive by conducting strikes on critical targets inside the Turkish border. Syrian aircraft operations are covered by IADS SCC WEST (destroyed/degraded) and SCC NORTH, affecting CJTF forces operating on both sides of the Turkish border as well.

The Syrian Airforce are believed to have significant numbers of aircraft staged out of airbases at JIRAH, ABU UL DUHUR, TABQA and HAMA – with additional squadrons deployed to airbases to the south further away from the frontlines. Recent VID assessments indicate that Jirah and Abu al-Duhur are no longer being used to stage aircraft owing to significant combat losses. Additionally, it is assessed that Tabqa airbase is degraded in capability at this time.

1.1.3 Syrian Naval Forces

Syria is expected to have squadrons based at both Latakia and Tartus, with both likely being tasked to prevent supplies and military vessels operating between Cyprus/Turkey and Syria. Recent VID publications report that Syrian forces have announced an embargo on all shipping destined to Turkey, alongside Russian forces who have publicly expressed their support for the same.

See OPAR CJTF82 OPERATIONAL ORDER, OPAR BRIEF and latest VIS INTSUM for additional information

1.2 Friendly Forces

1.2.1 CJTF Land Component

The US-led IV Corps consisting of the 55th Mech Division and the 56th Armored Division make up the land component for CJTF forces. 55th division is currently located at Iskenderun with the objective to move in and secure Hatay Airfield and the surrounding area, with the 56th division expected to launch an offensive to regain control of Gaziantep International Airport beginning on D4.



1.2.2 CJTF Maritime Component

The CJTF Maritime component consists of Carrier Strike Group-72 (CSG-72) and Surface Action Group 1 (SAG-1). CSG-72 is led by the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) and is supported by one Ticonderoga-class cruiser carrying TLAMs. SAG-1 consists of one Oliver Hazzard Perry-class frigate and one Arleigh Burke-class destroyer also carrying TLAMs.

SAG-1 is currently stationed in the Western Mediterranean in support of other allied shipping objectives.

1.2.3 CJTF Special Operations Component

Special Operations Component Command consists of 4 Special Operations Task Groups based both in Israel and Turkey.

1.2.4 CJTF Joint Force Air Component

The CJTF Joint Force Air component makes up the bulk of the CJTF force, consisting of the 132nd Virtual Wing with its nine squadrons as well as external organizations. The CJTF land-based air assets will be based out of Incirlik AB in Turkey (338th vFS and 617th vFS) with rotary wing assets at FARPs (656th vRS). Sea based air assets will be embarked on CVN-72 (494th vFS and 108th vFS). RAF Aktrotiri and RAF Kingsfield in Cyprus provides additional staging points for supporting assets like E-3 Sentries and KC-135 Stratotankers.

See OPAR CJTF82 OPERATIONAL ORDER, OPAR BRIEF, LCC CONOPS and VIS INTSUM D0 for additional information

2 Mission

JFACC seeks to support the JFCs objectives by establishing air supremacy within the AO; defeating Syrian IADS and Air capabilities such that a permissive environment for further air operations is progressively created. Alongside this, a campaign of air interdiction will take places, striking strategic Syrian targets to impact both the will and ability of the Syrian armed forces to conduct military operations. Direct support will also be provided to the LCC in support of land operations.

JFACC will continue to support CJTF82 operations facilitating a lasting peace without international military presence.

3 Air Operations

3.1 Joint Force Air Organization

3.1.1 132nd Virtual Wing

617 th Fighter Squadron	A-10C	Incirlik AB
388 th Fighter Squadron	F-16C	Incirlik AB
494th Fighter Squadron	F/A-18C	CVN-72 USS Abraham Lincoln
108 th Fighter Squadron	F-14B	CVN-72 USS Abraham Lincoln
656th Rotary Squadron	AH-64D	FARP Hatay
259th Auxiliary Squadron	Mi-8TV2	FARP Hatay / Incirlik AB



176th Air Control Squadron	E-3	RAF Akrotiri	
23 rd Special Tactics Sqn.	N/A	[Redacted]	

3.1.2 Supporting Assets

Tactical Mobility Squadron 1	KC-135 MPRS	RAF Akrotiri
Tactical Mobility Squadron 2	KC-135	RAF Akrotiri
Air Defense Artillery Battalion	MIM-104 Patriot	Incirlik AB (Battery 1)
		Cyprus (Battery 2)

3.2 Joint Force Air Objectives

JFACC has established the following objectives in order to support the objectives established by JFC in the CJTF82 Operation Order.

3.2.1 Establish Air Superiority over Turkey

3.2.1.1	Deny SyAF ability to affect operations in Turkey	
3.2.1.2	Deny Syrian IADS systems ability to affect operations in Turkey	
3.2.1.3	Deny Syrian Long-Range MLRS artillery the ability to affect operations in Turkey	

3.2.2 Defeat Syrian Forces in Turkey

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3.2.2.1	Provide support for LCC in order to achieve LCC's main objectives
3.2.2.2	Deny Syrian 1 st and 2 nd Corps logistical support
3.2.2.3	Destroy C2 capabilities supporting the Syrian offensive into Turkey
3.2.2.4	Deny Syrian Armed Forces access into Turkey
3.2.2.5	Affect the Syrian will to fight by destroying vital supplies and infrastructure

3.2.3 Destroy Syrian WMD capabilities

3.2.3.1 Neutralize Syrian Surface-to-Surface missile regiments	
3.2.3.2	Deny Syrian forces the ability to produce and store chemical weapons
3.2.3.3	Deny Syrian Armed forces the ability to research NBC WMDs

3.2.4 Establish Air Superiority over Syria

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3.2.4.1 Deny Syrian IADS the ability to affect operations in Syria		Deny Syrian IADS the ability to affect operations in Syria
	3.2.4.2	Deny SyAF ability to affect operations in Syria
	3.2.4.3	Deny Syrian Long-range MLRS artillery the ability to affect operations in Syria

3.2.5 Neutralize Syrian Army Offensive Capabilities

3.2.2.1	Neutralize enemy ability to coordinate attacks effectively	
3.2.2.2	Neutralize enemy ability to maneuver and attack by interdicting logistical network	
	and transport infrastructure and destroying POL sites	
3.2.2.3	Attrit enemy Armored and Artillery divisions	



3.2.6 Reduce Syrian will to conduct Offensive Operations in the Region

3.2.2.1	Disrupt enemy supplies vital for operations and sustainment	
3.2.2.2	Deny access to money by destroying the Ministry of Finance	
3.2.2.3	Deny security by destroying important places of residence (Commander's	
	residences and the Presidential Palace)	
3.2.2.4	Degrade the ability to mobilize reserve forces by destroying the Ministry of	
	Foreign Affairs	
3.2.2.5	Degrade the Syrian High Command's ability to plan and execute offensive	
	operations by destroying the Ministry of Defense	

3.3 Phases of Joint Air Operations in Relation to CJTF Operation

3.3.1 Phase 1: Shaping

JFACC will be the supported commander for this phase of the campaign.

The initial efforts will be towards securing freedom of movement for own forces on the Turkish side of the border by securing the Hatay area and engaging Syrian forces occupying Turkish territory (JFACC 1.1, JFACC 1.2). Throughout the phase, JFACC will also seek to prosecute targets on the Syrian side of the border in order to disrupt, attrit or destroy Syrian assets projecting military power into Turkey - limiting Syrian ability to reinforce, support and maneuver (JFACC 1.1, JFACC 1.2).

This phase of operations is divided into sub-phases:

In phase 1.1, sorties will be conducted to target long-range SAM batteries within Turkish territory and within Syria near to the Turkish border. A combination of SEAD/DEAD and Air Interdiction taskings aim to degrade the Syrian IADS capabilities to a point where there is a significantly reduced threat to friendly forces operating in this area.

In doing so, JFACC will facilitate the creation of more open corridors to transit further into Syrian airspace, such that deeper Air Interdiction sorties can be conducted.

Alongside this action and throughout all phases, Offensive Counter Air sorties will be launched with the intention of directly engaging Syrian Air Force assets as they muster in CAP locations, in reaction to QRA launches or aggressively sweeping ahead of friendly packages. Where sufficient opportunities present, strikes will be conducted against known staging bases for Syrian aircraft with the aim of preventing their use. Concurrently, DCA sorties will ensure the protection of friendly air assets operating within the AO.

It is intended that this combination of SEAD/DEAD, AI and OCA sorties will create a permissive environment in which the goals of JFACC can be met.

Later, in phase 1.2, the deliberate taskings reach further south, utilising the newly created transit corridors and ensuring freedom of movement for friendly forces throughout Syrian territory through the destruction of strategic SAM assets throughout Syria.

The phase ends:

- Friendly air assets can operate liberally, with little or no threat from SAM or SyAF assets. 'Little threat; will be considered met when flights can operate on a selfescorted basis.
- An environment exists which facilitates the projection of friendly air power into Syrian territory



3.3.2 Phase 2: Decisive Action

The LCC will be the supported commander in this phase.

In the second phase, JFACC will conduct a number of sorties in order to completely degrade the ability for Syrian forces to wage war throughout the region. Strikes will take place against military assets, command and control infrastructure and logistical assets supporting the effort for Syrian forces to wage war.

In phase 2.1, JFACC will prioritise targeting command and control infrastructure, removing the ability for Syrian forces to conduct a cohesive defence of Syria in support of the LCCs offensive operation. Continued pressure against Syrian C2 targets is intended to stun Syrian assets, segregating deployed units.

In phase 2.1, JFACC will prioritise targeting manufacturing and logistical capabilities within Syria in an effort to inhibit the supply, transportation and subsequently, munitions, in military operations. The removal of military manufacturing and distribution capabilities is hoped to inhibit the capabilities of the Syrian people to fight.

These deliberate taskings will be aimed at destroying Command and Control infrastructure managing Syrian forces, as well as logistics and manufacturing infrastructure supporting the production or disbursement of resources contributing to Syria's ability to conduct war.

The phase will end when the ability for Syrian forces to aggress neighboring nations has been nullified.

3.3.3 Phase 3: Stabilization

The LCC will be the supporter commander in this phase.

In the final phase of the campaign, CJTF82 intends to work to bring stability to the region by engaging in deliberate taskings to remove the ability for Syrian forces to wage war in the future. Research and development, manufacturing and any remaining munitions storage facilities will be destroyed.

3.3.4 Timing and duration of phases

LCC and JFACC anticipate that Phase 1 will take approximately 12 days. There are currently no estimates for phases two and three.

3.4 Coordinating Instructions.

- Civilian air traffic is expected in and out of Beirut, Lebanon. Civilian traffic will follow published routes in Airspace Control Plan (ACP).
- Civilian air traffic is expected in and out of Haifa, Israel. Civilian traffic will follow published routes in Airspace Control Plan (ACP).
- Civilian air traffic is expected in and out of Adana, Turkey. Civilian traffic will follow published routes in Airspace Control Plan (ACP).
- Civilian air traffic is expected in and out of Larnaca, Cyprus. Civilian traffic will follow published routes in Airspace Control Plan (ACP).
- All other civilian airfields in Turkey, Israel, Cyprus and Lebanon is closed for civilian traffic.
- JFACC will organize the provision of reminders on GUARD for civilian air traffic to remain clear of the area of the conflict.
- All air crew are responsible for positively classifying aircraft as per standing SPINS in order to prevent the downing of civilian air traffic.



 All air crew are responsible for positively identifying aircraft as Syrian before engaging in order to prevent Russian forces from being unduly drawn into the conflict.

3.5 Expected sortie availability (for planning purposes)

A-10: 4-8

• F/A-18: 4-8

• F-16: 4-6

• F-14: 1-2

AH-64D: 2-3

KC-135: 3

• E-3: 1

3.5.1 Surge operations:

Supporting assets, such as KC-135, KC-135 MPRS and E-3 can surge their operations for one ATO day (increasing their numbers by one, but the next event will then have one aircraft less due to maintenance). Decision to conduct surge operations rests with JFACC and is ordered in the AOD if required.

4 Logistics.

Owing to other ongoing military efforts, the supply of certain munitions is restricted during the campaign. Specific limitations are listed in the OPORDER (available at OPAR BRIEF) and will be repeated if further constraints are imposed by JFACC in each published AOD.

Air crews are responsible for reporting any expenditure of munitions.

5 Command. Control. and Communications

5.1 Command

All air operations (including rotary wing and naval air operations) are conducted under the control of JFACC.

5.1.1 Chain of command:

JFACC --> AWACS --> (Mission Commander) --> Flight lead Mission commander only relevant for COMAO/Package operations tasked as such on the ATO.

- JFACC breaks down daily guidance and priority from JFC into an executable Air Tasking Order (ATO).
- During execution of the ATO, AWACS is delegated authority from JFACC to execute the mission in accordance with (IAW) JAOP, AOD and ATO .
- For each ATO day a AOD will be published from JFACC that provides updated guidance, priorities and allocation. AOD D1 will give guidance for ATO D1.
- Daily a ATO will be published, based on the AOD.
- (Daily= Per event. 1 event/1 day= 14 day cycle minimum)



5.2 Communications

Regardless of tasking, all flights **must** check-in in to DARKSTAR (even if unmanned) in order to allow for re-tasking if required.

Frequencies and callsigns IAW OPAR SPINS (available on OPAR briefing page).